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Content, Mood, and Force 
 
 
 
 
I. The standard picture 
 
What I am going to call the ‘standard picture’ in speech act theory is due to John 
Searle (taking inspiration from Frege, Reichenbach, Stenius, Austin, Hare and Wittgenstein). 
It consists of two main claims : 
 
(1) Leaving aside the speech acts which are devoid of representational content 
(‘expressives’, in Searle’s classification), the content of a speech act is always of the 
same semantic type : it is a proposition.
1
 Thus, the order ‘Go to the store, John !’, the 
question ‘Will John go to the store ?’ and the assertion ‘John will go to the store’ 
differ by their illocutionary force (that of an order, a question, and an assertion 
respectively) but they (allegedly) share the same content : they represent the same 
state of affairs (John going to the store), corresponding to the same proposition (that 
John will go to the store). So understood, speech act content is ‘force neutral’. 
(2) So-called ‘sentence moods’ — that is the devices, whatever they are, that differentiate 
clause-types into declarative, interrogative, imperative, exclamative, etc. — encode 
illocutionary force and do not affect representational content. They are ‘illocutionary 
force indicating devices’ (IFIDs, as they used to be called in the seventies). 
 
I mentioned Austin among the forerunners of the standard picture, because he put forward 
something akin to the content/force distinction (the distinction between the ‘locutionary’ act 
and the ‘illocutionary’ act), and insisted that there are illocutionary force indicators, free of 
descriptive or representational content. It is, I think, uncontroversial that Austin embraced 
claim (2) of the standard picture. But his locutionary/illocutionary distinction is notoriously 
hard to interpret, and it is not totally clear that he accepted claim (1) above. To his view I now 
turn. 
                                                 
1
 Of course, there may be constraints on the specific propositions that can be the content of a 
given speech act – for example, according to Searle, the content of a directive speech act can 
only be a proposition about a future action of the hearer. For a critique of this constraint, see 
Recanati 1981/87 : 161-63 and 2007a : 127-28. 
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2. The Austinian picture 
 
To perform a locutionary act, Austin says, is to utter a grammatical sentence endowed with a 
definite meaning or content (which he glosses as ‘sense and reference’).2 In performing a 
locutionary act, one typically also performs an illocutionary act, whose identity depends upon 
the ‘force’ of the utterance — something that is not part of its meaning or content in the 
narrow sense.
3
 So the locutionary act, in Austin’s framework, is the act of expressing a certain 
content, while the illocutionary act consists in the expression of a certain content with a 
certain force. Illocutionary force is construed as a supplementary dimension, something that 
comes on top of locutionary content. This certainly sounds a lot like the standard picture. Still, 
one cannot straightforwardly equate Austin’s locutionary/illocutionary distinction and 
Searle’s content/force distinction, because certain passages in Austin’s work suggest that he 
may have meant to include the contribution of sentence mood into the ‘locutionary’ content of 
an utterance (see Recanati 1981/1987 : chapter 9 for a detailed discussion). 
To report the locutionary act performed by uttering a sentence, Austin says, we use 
indirect speech : the locutionary act performed by means of the sentence ‘The cat is on the 
mat’ is the act of saying that the cat is on the mat, the locutionary act performed by uttering 
‘Get out’ is the act of telling the addressee to get out, the locutionary act performed by 
uttering ‘Is it in Oxford or Cambridge ?’ is the act of asking whether it is in Oxford or 
Cambrige. It is clear that in these reports, which are said to capture the locutionary content of 
the utterance, expressions like ‘say that’, ‘tell to’ and ‘ask whether’ track the mood of the 
uttered sentence. It seems, therefore, not impossible that Austin took declarative, imperative 
and interrogative sentences to express different types of locutionary content, as if the sentence 
moods contributed to locutionary content.  
 
3. Searle’s critique of Austin 
 
                                                 
2
 To qualify as locutionary, the meaning of an expression must endow it with representational 
powers. Thus ‘Ouch’ has no locutionary meaning, for Austin (1975 : 33). This shows that the 
descriptive/referential dimension is essential to locutionary content. 
3
 ‘I want to distinguish force and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to 
sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference’ (Austin 
1975 : Lec. 8) 
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Austin’s remarks suggest that locutionary content includes as a proper part the force-neutral 
nucleus Searle talks about (‘sense and reference’, as Austin puts it), and adds to it the element 
contributed by sentence-mood, namely the indication regarding illocutionary force. 
Locutionary content thus understood consists of two rather heterogeneous ingredients : 
 
• a representational content that is made contextually specific in all relevant respects. (The 
locutionary act is the act of using words with a determinate sense and a determinate reference, 
Austin repeatedly says. Context and speaker’s intentions play a crucial role in making them 
determinate.) 
• a broad type of illocutionary force, namely that which is encoded by the sentence mood. 
 
In contrast to sense-and-reference, force will only be made contextually determinate at the 
illocutionary level : at the locutionary level, the only element of force is what is encoded by 
sentence mood qua expression type. 
 Searle has strongly objected to this picture. When you put together a content (in the 
restricted, Searlean sense) and a force, however generic, what you get is an illocutionary act. 
So locutionary acts – the sort of thing one reports by saying ‘he asked whether…’, ‘he said 
that…’, or ‘he told me to…’ — are actually illocutionary acts. What distinguishes them from 
full-blooded illocutionary acts is only the fact that, at the so-called ‘locutionary’ level, the 
force of the utterance remains generic or (better) determinable. Contextual specification of 
force only comes into the picture at the next level — the ‘illocutionary’ level. According to 
Searle, however, the asymmetry between force and content as far as contextual specification 
is concerned has no justification, and once we get rid of it the whole distinction between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts collapses. The only operative distinctions are : (i) the 
distinction between (neutral) content, i.e. sense-and-reference, and force ; and (ii) the 
distinction between the linguistic meaning of expression types and the contextually specified 
meaning of their utterances. This second distinction applies both to the linguistic forms which 
contribute to representational content and to those which indicate illocutionary force. It 
follows that the locutionary/illocutionary distinction 
 
is only a special case of the distinction between literal meaning and intended meaning, 
between what the sentence means and what the speaker means in its utterance, and it 
has no special relevance to the general theory of illocutionary forces, because intended 
illocutionary force is only one of the aspects (sense and reference are others) in which 
 4 
intended speaker-meaning may go beyond literal sentence-meaning. (Searle 1968 : 
149) 
  
4. Rescuing locutionary content 
 
The Austinian distinction between the locutionary and the illocutionary act can be rescued 
from Searle’s objection that Austin’s ‘locutionary act’ is nothing but a generic illocutionary 
act ; and this can be done consistently with the standard picture.
4
  
On the standard picture, the overall meaning of an utterance consists of two 
ingredients : the proposition expressed, and the illocutionary force indicated by the mood. The 
meaning of an utterance is therefore like an image of the speech act, in its two dimensions 
(force + content). But the speech act thus depicted need not be the speech act the speaker 
actually performs by uttering the sentence. There are well-known cases (e.g. indirect speech 
acts, irony) in which the speech act actually performed is not the speech act that is 
conventionally depicted.
5
 This suggests the following reinterpretation of Austin’s 
locutionary/illocutionary distinction (Recanati 1981/1987 : chapter 9, 2007b, 2010 : chapter 
6) : 
 
• The ‘locutionary act’ is the act of making an utterance which, in virtue of its meaning, 
presents a certain illocutionary act as being performed (whether or not the act in question is 
actually performed). 
• The ‘illocutionary act’ is the illocutionary act actually performed (whether or not it 
corresponds to what the sentence encodes). 
 
The distinction between the two levels provides a way of integrating the two notions 
of assertion which Kölbel (2010) distinguishes : the ‘conventional’ notion (to assert is to utter 
a sentence of the assertive type, something one can do inadvertently) and the ‘intentional’ 
notion (to assert is to make an utterance with a certain kind of audience-directed intention, 
something one cannot do inadvertently). Both notions, C-assertion and I-assertion, are 
legitimate and an adequate account should make room for them. On my account, C-assertion 
corresponds to the case in which the speaker makes an utterance which presents itself as an I-
                                                 
4
 Below we shall consider alternative interpretations of Austin’s distinction which reject claim 
1 of the standard picture. 
5
 As McGinn puts it, ‘mood… conventionally and standardly signifies force, but it cannot 
guarantee it’ (McGinn 1977 : 303). This is an application of Davidson’s thesis of ‘the 
Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning’ (Davidson 1979 ; for discussion, see Green 1997). 
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assertion. It is clear that, on this account, one notion is more basic than the other. The 
locutionary act is defined in terms of the illocutionary act : the locutionary act is the act of 
making an utterance that conventionally signifies the performance of a certain illocutionary 
act. Similarly, the act of C-assertion is defined in terms of the more basic notion of I-
assertion.
6
 
The distinction between the speech act which is depicted and the speech act which is 
performed is needed to account for irony and indirect speech acts (Recanati 1980). Taken 
seriously, it leads to a further distinction, which proves useful in semantic analysis : that 
between the (‘external’) context of the actual speech act and the (‘internal’) context of the 
illocutionary act which the speaker presents as being performed. Such a distinction, originally 
put forth by Ducrot (1980) and Recanati (1981/1987),
7
 is arguably the key to understanding 
complex phenomena such as the behaviour of indexicals in free indirect speech. (See 
Schlenker 2004 for a similar idea, and Recanati 2010 : 198-204 for a synthesis.) 
 
5. Types of locutionary content 
 
In a paper in which he tries to make sense of Austin’s remarks,8 Strawson tentatively puts 
forward a division of locutionary contents into types, corresponding to clause-types (Strawson 
2000: 206). Propositions (the bearers of truth and falsity) are the type of locutionary content 
expressed by declarative sentences, Strawson says. Imperative utterances are not evaluable as 
true or false, and this suggests that they do not express propositions, but a different type of 
locutionary content, which Strawson proposes to call an ‘imperative’ : 
 
In every case in which a locution as a whole expresses a proposition, we should say 
that its locutionary meaning is the proposition expressed. For such other broad classes 
of locutions as we may find it expedient to distinguish from proposition-expressing 
locutions, we shall need terms of art comparable with the term ‘proposition’, to set 
beside the latter. Let us suppose that ‘imperative’ is one such term, imperatives being 
variously expressible with the force of pieces of advice, requests, commands, 
recommendations, prayers, invitations, etc. (…) A scheme for separately specifying 
the illocutionary force and the locutionary meaning of single utterances which, as 
                                                 
6
 Another reason why the notion of illocutionary act (or the special case of I-assertion) is 
more basic is that locutionary acts are typed according to the type of illocutionary act they 
depict. 
7
 See also Sperber and Wilson 1981 for a hint in the same direction. 
8
 ‘Austin and ‘Locutionary Meaning’’, first published in 1973 in I. Berlin et al., Essays on J.L. 
Austin (Oxford University Press), and reprinted in Strawson’s collection, Entity and Identity, 
and Other Essays (2000). 
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wholes, express propositions or imperatives (or any other broad classes we find it 
expedient to distinguish) might be imagined as follows : 
 
X issues the __ (that …) with the force of a --- 
 
A specification of the general type of locutionary meaning fills the first blank, of 
specific locutionary content the second, of illocutionary force the third. Thus we might 
have such fillings as these : 
 
  (1) proposition (that S is P) 
X issues the   (2) imperative (that Z (person) is to Y (act)) 
   (3) ? 
            
 
(1) accusation, report, forecast, conclusion, objection, 
as a              hypothesis, guess, verdict, etc. 
with the force of a (2) command, request, piece of advice, prayer, invitation, 
by way of               entreaty, etc. 
(3) ? 
(Strawson 2000 : 206-207) 
 
On this elaboration of the Austinian picture, speech acts with different types of force 
have different types of locutionary content. That means that one gives up tenet 1 of the 
standard picture: that the content of a speech act is always of the same semantic type, namely 
a proposition. On Strawson’s proposal, propositions are only one semantic type, 
corresponding to the locutionary content of a particular family of speech acts. Other families 
of speech acts, such as directives, have locutionary content of a different semantic type. (See 
Pendlebury 1986 : 368-70 for a similar proposal.)
 9
 
Several recent theories have been put forward which follow Strawson’s lead in 
rejecting tenet 1 of the standard picture. I will mention two such revisionary trends that have 
appeared in the recent literature, one in philosophy — in connection with the problem of the 
‘unity of the proposition’ — and one in linguistics. 
 
6. Locutionary content and the unity of the proposition 
 
In ‘The Force-Content Distinction’ (Hanks 2007), Peter Hanks argues as follows. We need to 
include a modicum of illocutionary force into content because without such an addition there 
would be no content at all. Force-neutral content is a myth. Why is that so ? Because we need 
                                                 
9
 Dummett (1973 : 307) objects to such proposals, on shaky grounds. See Recanati 
1981/1987 : 260-66 for a critique of Dummett’s position. 
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something to tie together the ingredients of content – that is the infamous problem of the 
‘unity of the proposition’, which worried the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and is 
widely considered as still in need of a solution (see Gibson 2004, King 2007, Gaskin 2008, 
Soames 2010, Collins 2011). In a nutshell, the problem is this. If I assert that John is bald, the 
content of my assertion is the proposition that John is bald. That proposition has John and 
baldness as constituents, but it is more than a list or aggregate of constituents – it can be true 
or false. What is it that makes a truth-evaluable proposition out of an object and a property ? 
Hanks argues that what provides the ‘glue’ tying together the constituents of the proposition is 
actually the force, e.g. the fact that, when I assert that John is bald, I ascribe baldness to John 
or assert baldness of him.
10
 Hanks concludes that  
 
the content–force distinction should be abandoned altogether. I am skeptical of the 
idea that there are propositional contents that represent states of affairs independently 
of what speakers do in making assertions or forming judgments. An account has to be 
given of how these contents represent states of affairs that does not make any appeal to 
the intentional actions of speakers. I doubt that there is any way to do this. (Hanks 
2007 : 143)
 11
 
 
 
Hanks therefore rejects the first tenet of the standard picture — claim (1) above, to the effect 
that speech act content is force-neutral. Speech act content is not force-neutral, and it does not 
even include a force-neutral content as a proper part. There is no force-neutral content, at the 
sentential level. Barker (2004) similarly bids ‘farewell to the sense/force distinction’ (Barker 
2004 : 81). As he puts it, ‘there is no common stock of thoughts — propositional contents — 
that are shared by fully interpreted sentences across moods’ (Barker 2004 : 84). 
 
7. The Frege-Geach point : predication vs assertion 
 
                                                 
10
 When the speech act is not an assertion but, say, an order, it is not the assertive component 
but the imperative component that provides the glue tying together the object and the 
property. 
11
 Friederike Moltmann holds a similar view : ‘John’s belief that he will win (or John’s 
expectation that he will win) is not a proposition, but rather what I call an attitudinal object 
(Moltmann, 2003). John’s belief that he is the winner is not a proposition because it has 
properties that relate specifically to the belief mode and the agent… The attitudinal mode can 
be seen as providing the ‘glue’ among the propositional constituents so as to guarantee that 
the attitudinal object have satisfaction conditions’ (Moltmann 2010 : 456-57). 
 8 
One might think there is an obvious objection to the Barker-Hanks approach, related to the 
reason why the force/content distinction was introduced in the first place. This is the so-called 
‘Frege-Geach point’ (Geach 1960, 1965).12 If assertive force was part of the content of a 
sentence, all the occurrences of the sentence expressing that content ought to have that force. 
But precisely, for every indicative sentence, there can be occurrences of that sentence with 
assertive force and other occurrences without assertive force, while content remains 
unchanged. A proposition is unasserted when, for example, it is expressed by the antecedent 
of a conditional. Were it not for that fact that the same content can occur ‘now asserted and 
now unasserted’ (as Geach puts it ), modus ponens would be invalid. It follows that assertive 
force is not — cannot be — part of content : content and force simply do not mix.13 
Appearances notwithstanding, one can accept this view, and a strict content/force 
distinction, while retaining Hanks’s pragmatic solution to the problem of the unity of the 
proposition. One can maintain that what provides the ‘glue’ is an ‘intentional action of the 
speaker’, as Hanks puts it, provided the act in question is itself neutral with regard to the issue 
of illocutionary force. According to Soames, whose general view is otherwise very similar to 
Hanks’s, what provides the glue is the act of predication, which is performed whether the 
proposition is asserted or remains unasserted (Soames 2010).
14
 Predication is force-neutral, so 
using the act of predication (rather than the act of assertion) to unify the proposition is 
compatible with the standard picture and does not require rejecting the first of its two defining 
claims.  One problem with this view, however, is that it is mysterious what exactly 
predication is. To predicate a property of an object, on this view, is not to ascribe it to the 
object – for that would take us back to the notion of assertion and to Hanks’s theory. On the 
other hand one cannot simply characterize ‘predication’ as whatever ties the object and the 
property together— for that would deprive the approach of any explanatory power. 
Weakening Hanks’s theory in the manner of Soames is unnecessary, however ; for 
Hanks has a response to the Frege-Geach challenge.
15
 He denies a premise in the above 
                                                 
12
 In Speech Acts, Searle makes the same point in criticizing speech act theoretic approaches 
to the meaning of various locutions (Searle 1969 : 136-41). 
13
 This seems to entail as a corollary that mood and illocutionary force indicators should not 
embed. But it is not obvious that that is the case : see Pendlebury 1986, Green 2000 and 
Barker 2004 for discussion. This is a vast and complex topic which cries out for detailed 
linguistic investigation. (On the syntax and semantics of speech act embedding, see 
respectively Heycock 2006 and Krifka 2011.) 
14
 Both Austin and Strawson acknowledge an ‘ancillary act’ of predication intrinsic to the 
locutionary act. 
15
 See Barker 2004 for a similar response. 
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argument : ‘If assertive force was part of the content, all the occurrences of the sentence 
expressing that content ought to have that force’. Instead, Hanks admits that some 
occurrences will not have the force, not because force is not part of content, but because there 
are cancelling devices such that when a content (with a force ingredient) occurs in the scope 
of the device, the force ingredient is cancelled :  
 
Frege’s main reason for adopting the content–force distinction—the fact that we do 
not assert the antecedent or the consequent in an utterance of a conditional—is 
consistent with thinking that an assertoric element is included in the contents of 
declarative sentences. Frege’s reaction to this fact about conditionals was to hold that 
the contents of declarative sentences are devoid of any assertive element, but this is 
not the only reaction one might have. An alternative is to hold that in certain contexts, 
for example, when a sentence is used inside a conditional, the assertive element is 
cancelled by the presence of the conditional. (Hanks 2011: 15) 
 
 
8. Mood and force (1) 
 
Another revisionary trend has appeared in the recent linguistics literature. It rejects not only 
the first tenet of the standard picture, but also the second tenet, namely the claim that sentence 
mood encodes illocutionary force. Sentence moods admittedly correlate with types of force, 
but this is different from encoding them (Kissine 2013). According to Paul Portner (2004), 
what a clause-type expresses is nothing but a speech act content – it does not include a force 
component – but speech acts with different types of force happen to have different types of 
content. Declarative, imperative and interrogative utterances have different types of content, 
on this view, and the different types of content they have enable them to serve in the 
performance of different types of speech acts. Declarative utterances express propositions, 
and propositions are what we assert : this is sufficient to forge a link between the declarative 
mood and the force of assertion, without having to suppose that the declarative mood directly 
encodes the illocutionary force of assertion. Likewise for the other moods : what they encode 
is a distinctive type of content, one that happens to correlate with a certain type of force.  
As far as questions are concerned, there is indeed a consensus among formal 
semanticists, to the effect that interrogative sentences do not express propositions (functions 
from worlds to truth-values), but contents of a different type, e.g. functions from worlds to 
propositions (Groenendijk and Stockhof) or functions from worlds to sets of propositions 
(Hamblin-Karttunen). Like Hausser before him (Hausser 1980), Portner generalizes this move 
 10 
and takes the content of imperative utterances to be also a semantic object of a non-
propositional type. Which object ? Portner says it is a property. Simplifying somewhat, the 
(familiar) idea is that the content of an imperative utterance like ‘Go home’ is the property of 
going home.
16
  
Since a proposition is or determines a function from worlds to truth-values, it can be 
evaluated as true or false (at a world). Being truth-evaluable, it can be asserted, i.e. presented 
as true at the actual world and put forward as a candidate for inclusion in the ‘common 
ground’ (Stalnaker 1978). Imperative and interrogative contents don’t determine a function 
from worlds to truth-values, so they cannot be evaluated as true or false (at a world), and they 
cannot be asserted. However, the content of a question can be added to the ‘question-set’ 
which plays for questions the same role as the common ground for assertions (Ginzburg 
1995a, 1995b ; Ginzburg & Sag 2001); and similarly, according to Portner, the content of an 
imperative can be added to the hearer’s ‘to-do list’ (Portner 2004). 
To sum up : while the standard speech-act theoretic picture rests on the twin ideas that 
content type is shared across speech acts and that sentence mood encodes force, the 
revisionary picture put forward by Portner breaks entirely with this tradition. Portner holds 
that different speech acts have different types of content, and denies that sentence mood 
encodes force.
17
 
 
9. Mood and force (2) 
 
Portner’s wholesale rejection of the standard picture, including the second tenet, forces him to 
account for the correlation between sentence moods and illocutionary forces indirectly, by 
positing special types of content expressed by interrogative, declarative and imperative 
sentences respectively. These contents happen to be the contents appropriate for speech acts 
with respectively interrogative, assertive and directive force, but the forces in question are not 
                                                 
16
 Properties have already been used as semantic type, by Lewis in his theory of de se 
attitudes (Lewis 1979). On Lewis’s story, to assert something is to self-ascribe the property 
that is the content of the de se assertion. One might similarly hold that to issue a command is 
to ascribe to the hearer, in all the worlds compatible with the command (i.e. the worlds that 
are options for the hearer), the property that is the content of the command. 
17
 There is room also for hybrid positions — positions according to which the standard picture 
(or one of its tenets) is justified in certain cases and the revisionary picture in other cases. 
Thus Frege took declaratives and yes-no interrogatives to express the same type of content (in 
accordance with the standard picture), but imperatives to express a different type of content 
altogether (in accordance with the revisionary picture). 
 11 
directly encoded by the clause-types to which they correspond. The speech act of questioning 
takes questions as content, and questions are expressed by interrogative sentences. Assertion 
takes propositions as content, and propositions are expressed by declarative sentences. 
Directives take ‘hearer’s properties’ as content, and imperative sentences express such 
properties, according to Portner. 
For interrogatives, as I said, most semanticists accept the claim that, in contrast to 
declaratives, they don’t express propositions. If they don’t, then, as Portner argues, we don’t 
have to treat the interrogative mood as an indicator of illocutionary force. The fact that 
interrogative sentences express the sort of content suitable for the speech act of questioning is 
enough to forge a link between that mood and that illocutionary force. So we can tentatively 
accept the revisionary picture for interrogatives.
18
 
For imperatives, however, things are far less clear. The analysis of imperative 
sentences remains, to this day, very much an open issue, and further investigations into their 
syntax and semantics are needed before we can adjudicate between the various proposals 
currently on the table (see Iatridou 2008 for an overview of the field). One of the proposals on 
the table is the old analysis inspired by the standard picture : it takes imperatives to have 
propositional content and to indicate the performance of an act of directive type. 
What about declaratives ? Here, Portner seems to be on safe ground. Everybody 
accepts that declarative sentences express propositions, and that propositions are the sort of 
thing we can assert or believe. That, it seems, is enough to forge the link which Porner wants 
between declaratives and the act of assertion. However, I think we should be more cautious. 
In my early work I offered reasons to doubt the existence of such a link, and I will end this 
review with a few considerations regarding that topic. 
 
10. The force and content of declaratives 
 
In Recanati 1981/1987 I introduced a fundamental distinction, based upon the ‘direction of 
fit’, between two broad types of illocutionary force for utterances. An utterance has 
‘performative force’ whenever it is meant to bring about the state of affairs it represents, 
                                                 
18
 At least we can do so on standard parsimony assumptions. But parsimony may be the 
wrong sort of consideration. Maybe interrogative sentences both express a special type of 
content suited to the act of questioning and ‘mark’ that force through an IFID (Krifka 2011). 
This ‘redundancy’ approach has one advantage : in so-called declarative questions, we could 
say that a proposition is expressed (not a question) but the utterance is nevertheless marked as 
a question. 
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rather than report or describe the fact that that state of affairs obtains (‘constative force’). In 
that work I assumed that imperatives, commissives etc. have propositional content and 
represent a state of affairs, in accordance with the standard picture, and I took 
directive/commissive force to be a special case — a sub-type —of performative force. In 
directives, the state of affairs represented by the utterance is supposed to come about through 
some action performed by the hearer because of  the utterance. Directives are therefore 
characterized by the fact that the causal chain from the utterance to the state of affairs 
involves an intermediary step : the utterance motivates the hearer to act so as to bring about 
the state of affairs. Commissives, another type of speech acts with performative force, also 
feature mediated causation, but it is the speaker, not the hearer, whom the utterance motivates 
to act so as to bring about the state of affairs it represents. Directives and commissives alike 
differ from other performative speech acts which, like declarations, are supposed to bring 
about the state of affairs they represent without specifically burdening the speaker or the 
hearer. 
Now, whatever we think of that analysis of directives and commissives (which 
presupposes the standard picture), it is a striking fact that, quite systematically, declarative 
sentences — which undboutedly express propositions — have both constative and 
performative readings. ‘The session is open’ is a standard example of a performative 
utterance, whose role is to make it true that the session is open, but that sentence can also be 
uttered as a constative, with words to world direction of fit. A similar case is that of ‘it’s 
yours’ : an utterance of that sentence can be understood as an assertion (reporting the fact that 
it’s yours) or as a declaration, making it the case that it’s yours (in which case the proper 
answer is ‘Really ? Thanks !’). Like the shopping list in Anscombe’s famous example, 
declarative sentences can be taken in two different ways according to the direction of fit. 
Anscombe’s example is that of a man who goes to the market with a shopping list and is 
followed by a detective who makes a list of everything he buys (Anscombe 1963 : 56). The 
two lists are identical because both correspond to the man’s purchases, but the direction of fit 
is not the same : the man’s purchases conform to the shopping list provided by his wife, while 
the detective’s list conforms to the man’s purchases. Now the shopping list in Anscombe’s 
example could be replaced by a declarative utterance by the wife — ‘ you are going to buy X, 
Y and Z’ — the role of which would also be to make it the case that the husband buys X, Y 
and Z. Like ‘It’s yours’ and ‘The session is open’, such a sentence could be uttered as a 
constative as well (if the wife was predicting her husband’s purchases). In general, a sentence 
like ‘You are going to do A’ can be an order, a promise, a declaration or a wish as well as a 
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prediction, a guess, an accusation or an announcement. This is very different from imperative 
sentences, which can only be used performatively.
19
 If, in the shopping list example, the wife 
had said  ‘Buy X, Y, and Z’, the directive force of her utterance would be marked in such a 
way that the sentence could not be understood as a constative. In virtue of the imperative 
mood, an utterance of that sentence is bound to have the world to words direction of fit. The 
point of such an utterance can only be to make it the case that the represented state of affairs 
obtains, or that the hearer perform the represented action (if we think that the content of an 
imperative is not a proposition but an action of the hearer). 
The asymmetry I have emphasized between declarative and imperative sentences 
suggests that the declarative mood, in contrast to other sentence moods, does not set particular 
constraints on illocutionary force and leaves it free. In my early work, I argued that 
declarative sentences express propositions, but do not encode any illocutionary force 
(Recanati 1981/1987, 1982). Thus a declarative utterance can be performative as well as 
constative.
20
 Portner also says that declarative sentence express propositions, without 
encoding any illocutionary force ; but he maintains that the declarative clause-type correlates 
with assertion, even if it does not encode that illocutionary force. The correlation is 
established through the link between propositions and assertion. So both the standard picture 
and Portner’s revisionary picture accept the correlation between the declarative mood and 
assertion, even though they account for it differently. But, as a matter of empirical fact, it is 
doubtful that there is any such correlation. With imperative sentences, we notice what many 
authors describe as a wide variety of uses, but those uses remain unified by certain properties 
like the world to words direction of fit.
21
 No such unification makes sense for the uses of 
declarative sentences, so those who wish to maintain a strict correspondence between force, 
                                                 
19
 There are tricky examples, such as ‘Come and I shoot you’, whose performative character 
is far from obvious. Since it is unclear what the proper semantic analysis of such examples is, 
I ignore them here. 
20
 The performative/constative contrast was originally introduced by Austin as a contrast 
between two types of declarative utterances — or, more accurately, between two types of 
uses of declarative sentences. 
21
 See e.g. the list of uses of imperatives in Han (1999). Among them, wishes are the most 
difficult case for an analysis of imperatives based on direction of fit, but even in that case the 
analysis can be defended : wishes can be argued to have performative (world to words) 
direction of fit. (Even though the wisher’s utterance ‘Get well soon’ cannot rationally be 
expected to play any causal role in bringing about what it represents, still, one may argue, the 
wisher presents it as having the — magical — power to do so.) For a critique of this type of 
analysis, see Kissine 2013. 
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mood and content-type have to set the performative uses of declarative sentences aside (e.g. 
by treating such uses as ‘indirect speech acts’).22 
On my view, not only is the constative force not encoded by the declarative mood ; it 
does not correlate with it either. In contrast to other clause-types, declarative sentences do not 
correlate with any category of illocutionary force. They are illocutionarily neutral. A 
declarative sentence represents a state of affairs, that is all ; how the representation is 
interpreted (in illocutionary terms) is left to context. (Of course there is a blocking effect due 
to the competition with the other moods — those which do correlate with types of 
illocutionary force.) 
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